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Summary 
 
The global public revenue level of numerous African countries is low and the tax 
burden is highly concentrated on modern sector firms. One of the most current explanations 
for the low level of public revenue is the under-taxation of the urban unrecorded activities. 
The aim of this paper is to define an appropriate strategy in order to collect additional public 
resources from unrecorded activities in Sub-Saharan African Countries. 
In order to define an adapted taxation strategy for the unrecorded sector, informal 
micro-activities are distinguished from tax evasion activities (TEA). In Africa, the expansion 
of informal micro-activities is not fundamentally determined by their ability to evade taxes. 
On the contrary, the expansion of TEA, which are composed of large and small scale firms, is 
strongly linked to tax fraud (internal taxes, customs duties, etc.). The fundamental 
justifications of taxing the unrecorded activities differ according to the components of the 
unrecorded sector. Tax enforcement for TEA should produce substantial additional tax 
revenues and safeguards the durability of the tax collection system. With regard to informal 
micro-activities, taxation could be a significant tax revenue objective for local governments 
only and not for the central government. 
We examine the results of the measures aimed at taxing the unrecorded sector in some 
sub-Saharan African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso). Then, specific strategies are proposed 
in order to tax the informal micro-activities and TEA respectively. These strategies imply 
some specific tax measures widely implemented in Sub-Saharan African countries, such as a 
withholding tax profit. Some new measures, in particular a drastically simplified business tax 
for informal micro-activities, could be useful. With respect to tax collection, some innovative 
choices are suggested.  
 
Résumé 
Les ressources publiques de nombreux pays d’Afrique subsaharienne sont 
insuffisantes pour financer l’offre de biens publics nécessaires au développement de ces pays. 
De plus, la pression fiscale est excessivement concentrée sur le secteur moderne. Une des 
explications couramment avancées à ces deux phénomènes est la sous-fiscalisation des 
activités non enregistrées urbaines. L’objectif poursuivi ici est d’évaluer les stratégies mises 
en œuvre  pour mobiliser des ressources fiscales à partir des activités non enregistrées.  
A cette fin, on distingue parmi les activités non enregistrées, d’une part les micro-
activités informelles dont l’objectif essentiel est d’obtenir un emploi et, d’autre part,  les 
activités frauduleuses dont le développement dépend étroitement de la fraude fiscale. Cette 
distinction justifie des stratégies fiscales spécifiques à chacune de ces catégories d’activités. 
Seules les activités frauduleuses qui peuvent être de taille variable présentent un 
potentiel de recettes importants. Compte tenu de l’influence des groupes de pression, des 
stratégies fiscales de second rang ont été utilisées notamment à travers des acomptes au titre 
de l’impôt sur les bénéfices perçus sur les importations ou les  ventes locales des entreprises 
enregistrées. Des résultats substantiels ont été obtenus. Les micro-activités informelles, en 
dépit de leur importante contribution à la production et à l’emploi, présentent un faible 
potentiel de recettes fiscales inexploitées : elles permettent d’obtenir des revenus individuels 
souvent très faibles et elles supportent déjà à travers leur leurs achats de consommation 
intermédiaire l’incidence d’impôts indirects. Cependant, une patente synthétique indiciaire 
pourrait permettre de mobiliser une ressource pour financer les collectivités locales. Des 
modalités originales de recouvrement sont proposées.    
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 1. Introduction  
 
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa experience considerable difficulties in mobilizing 
public revenues. During the nineties, in order to alleviate these difficulties, the tax systems 
were simplified, modernized and adapted to the specific context of these countries. At the 
same time, particular importance was attached to improving tax administration. The results 
obtained are substantial as, despite the difficulties encountered in African countries, average 
public revenues in relation to the GDP remain similar to those of other groups of developing 
countries (Brun, Chambas, Combes, 2003). Like the other regions, African countries are 
currently implementing a tax transition process, characterized by the substitution of internal 
tax revenue for customs revenue. 
 
However, public revenues remain weak in numerous sub-Saharan African countries and 
the tax burden appears to be unevenly distributed. Two sectors are often considered as being 
under-taxed: the agricultural and the unrecorded urban sectors. Because of the characteristics 
of these two sectors, a specific analysis is needed for each one. The present analysis focuses 
on the unrecorded urban sector. Its under-taxation results in considerable losses in tax 
revenue. On a 57 developing countries sample, Alm and Martinez (2003) estimate these 
revenue losses up to 40 % of the potential public revenue. What is worse, the development of 
unrecorded activities is threatening the official sector, which plays a crucial role in collecting 
government resources (Bagahwa and Naho, 1995). 
 
After identifying the different components of the unrecorded sector
1, the aim of this paper 
is to evaluate their respective tax potential and then to define a tax collection strategy.  
 
 
2.  The importance of unrecorded activities 
   
Since the beginning of the 80s, extensive literature has shown the significant role 
played by the unrecorded economy in numerous countries and particularly in developing 
countries (Schneider, 2003). The unrecorded economy, also referred to as the “underground 
economy, hidden economy, shadow economy, black economy, …” (Dixon, 1999) remains 
difficult to appraise due to the diversity of the activities it covers as well as the unobservable 
nature of these activities. Nevertheless, it would seem that, in many countries, the size of the 
unrecorded sector has grown substantially since the end of the 70s with increasing taxation 
and regulation (Tanzi, 1999). 
 
2.1.  Informal activities vs. tax evasion activities: an important distinction 
 
In order to define a taxation strategy for the unrecorded sector, we differentiate 
unrecorded firms by segments. Two categories of unrecorded activities should be 
distinguished in addition to illegal activities
2: informal activities and tax evasion activities 
(TEA).  
                                                 
1 The urban unrecorded sector is henceforth designated as the “unrecorded sector”. 
2 Productive or commercial activities which violate the law (drug trafficking, etc.) which are not dealt with here. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
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 Informal activities 
In Africa, the informal sector is composed of small firms which “are not … recorded 
in official statistics (and which) … operate on a very small scale and with a low level of 
organization. It covers commercial or non-commercial activities (trade of goods and services, 
self-consumption, etc.). Most of these small firms use a very low level of capital with low 
productivity and low income” (Hussmanns, 1997) and most of them do not even keep any 
simple accounts (Terkper, 2003). This definition of the informal sector excludes modern small 
business (more precisely modern services) because modern small business uses sophisticated 
techniques and because in Africa, the size of this kind of activities is usually larger than the 
one of the micro-informal activities. In concrete terms, this sector is composed of small 
craftsmen (joiners, mechanics, builders, etc.), small service providers (water carriers, street 
peddlers, street sellers, pavement food stalls, washer-people, etc.) who operate, at least in part, 
on the fringe of regulations (labor and tax legislation) and who often satisfy the needs of the 
most disadvantaged part of the population. 
 
Various surveys demonstrate that in the case of African informal activities, tax non-
compliance often results not from an intentional act but from ignorance of the legislation or 
from the complexity of the tax system (Gautier, 2001, Ngoi, 1997, Roubaud, 1992). In 
Tanzania, the 1995 survey shows that the central aim of informal activities is to procure a job 
(Ngoi, 1997). Certainly, the willingness to evade taxes and their associated constraints (red 
tape, corruption) is not to be excluded, but tax evasion is not a decisive factor in the expansion 
of the informal activities
3. 
 
The informal sector micro-firms are supplied both by the recorded and unrecorded 
sector. They supply mainly the final consumer or the TEA. For instance in Benin, large-scale 
tax evaders use the services of small-scale informal firms to transport cars from Benin to 
Nigeria. Informal sector micro-firms rarely supply firms in the official sector as they are 
hampered
4 by the VAT mechanism and by a generally lower product quality. We will show 
later that, despite their importance, such informal activities are unlikely to compromise either 
the durability of the tax collection system or the level of government revenues. 
 
 Tax evasion activities (TEA) 
 
TEA is the second component of the unrecorded sector. Unlike informal activities, tax 
evasion or the willingness to avoid restrictive regulations are decisive factors in the expansion 
of these activities. Most of these activities can only survive by means of tax evasion. For 
instance, retailing petroleum products in the street (as in Benin for instance) results from 
evasion of tax and would not survive if the taxation laws were enforced. TEA seek to avoid 
regulations and taxes (notably tariffs, VAT and direct taxes) in order to generate additional 
profits and/or increase their competitiveness relative to firms in the official sector. The 
                                                 
3 Some small-scale activities can prove to be particularly difficult to disentangle: for example, street mechanics 
possess all the characteristics of informal sector firms but they purchase their inputs from TEA. 
4 Informal firms are not subject to VAT. Hence, they cannot deduct VAT paid on inputs purchased from 
registered firms.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
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decision to evade tax depends on the expected gain, taking into account the probability of 
detection and the cost of penalties.  
 
Two categories of TEA should be distinguished: on the one hand, unrecorded micro-
firms most often undertake small-scale fraudulent import-export activities
5, and on the other 
hand large-scale firms sometimes operating as registered firms, part of whose activities are 
fraudulent. 
 
In a large number of countries, the distortions generated by trade policies (tariffs, 
regulations, etc.)
6, the porosity of borders and the existence of traditional trade networks on 
both sides of the borders, favor the development of small-scale smuggling activities. Because 
of their large number and their small size, the smugglers prove difficult to monitor for the 
customs services whose material and human resources are insufficient. This is the case, for 
instance, of the charcharis in Djibouti. It is also the case of the micro-firms engaged in 
smuggling petroleum products between Benin and Nigeria. These smugglers buy cans of 
gasoline in Nigeria, transport them by dugout, then by motorbike and sell them in the streets 
of Benin. Despite the low unit value of the transactions, the volume of activity performed by 
these numerous small smugglers is considerable and, in the case of Benin
7, the parallel 
distribution networks for gasoline tend to supplant the official ones.  
 
Smuggling activities are not restricted to micro-firms: large firms are also involved. In 
some cases, large-scale firms  are not recorded and their whole activity belongs to the 
underground economy. In other cases, firms are identified and recorded by the tax 
administration although a significant part of their activities is not recorded. The expansion of 
these large-scale activities more often than not results from collusion between the public 
authorities and the TEA. In Africa, tax non-compliance is generally to be encountered in the 
sectors of construction, spare parts, petroleum products, cigarettes or alcohols, import-export 
of vehicles. Because of their size, these activities cannot be unnoticed, but they succeed in 
evading taxes and customs duties by means of sometimes very sophisticated strategies, 
solidarity networks, political and social influence. They also take advantage of the 
administrative weakness and resort to corruption. In countries such as Benin, Niger and Togo, 
these TEA are a fundamental component of economic activity.  
 
2.2. Estimating the size of the unrecorded sector in Africa 
   
The unrecorded sector is evaluated using several methods
8, the results of which can 
vary greatly. In the case of African countries, it is often measured using National Accounting 
data; it can also be appraised by means of intermediate consumptions, such as electricity, or 
money demand. Within the framework of these global approaches, it is not easy to measure 
the respective size of informal activities and TEA. Specific surveys concerning informal firms 
are sometimes available, but these surveys generally use different concepts and 
methodologies, which do not provide homogenous and directly comparable data. 
 
                                                 
5 The small-scale fraudulent sector is also likely to sell products purchased illegally from domestic companies. 
6 For example, between Nigeria and neighboring countries. 
7 Smuggling between Niger and Nigeria has been analyzed in Barlow and Snyder (1993). 
8 For a survey of the different methods used to evaluate the importance of underground activities, see Schneider 
and Enste, (2000).  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
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According to various analyses (Chickering and Salahdine, 1991; Schneider and Enst, 
2000; Schneider, 2003), unrecorded activities are particularly important in developing 
economies where they represent between 40 and 80 % of domestic value added. These figures 
are confirmed for African countries. For instance, at the beginning of the nineties the non-
agricultural unrecorded sector in Senegal represented more than 50 % of the GDP (Fall, 
1997). In Guinea, it represented
9 54 % of the GDP and 82 % of non-agricultural employment 
in 1994. In Tanzania in 1991, the unrecorded urban economy represented 33 % of the global 
GDP, this rate being estimated at approximately 50 % for Dar es Salaam  (Ngoi, 1997).  In 
Madagascar, the informal micro-firm sector represented 18 % of the GDP in 1998 (Paillaud et 
alii, 1998). These punctual observations are corroborated by Schneider (2003): on a sample of 
24 African countries, he estimates the contribution of the shadow economy between 28 % and 
60 % of GDP, the mean being 41 %. 
 
The importance of unrecorded activities can also be captured using observations 
relative to specific sectors. For instance in Benin, fraudulent car importations represent a 
considerable volume since, for a national market estimated at 10,000 vehicles, 250,000 
vehicles are imported and declared meant for the domestic market; in fact, most of them are 
re-exported illegally to Nigeria. Large-scale import-export smuggling activities also deal in 
the trade of second-hand tires and spare parts. Similarly, and in part in competition with 
Benin, large-scale TEA are also widespread in Togo. Obviously, these large-scale TEA 
benefit from powerful support within the countries. 
 
Consequently, in sub-Saharan Africa, the unrecorded urban sector provides a 
substantial contribution to economic activity.  
 
3. The justifications for taxing the unrecorded sector 
 
Attempts to tax the unrecorded sector generally pursue three main objectives: the 
collection of tax revenue, the preservation of the incentives system and the promotion of 
equity. 
 
3.1. Tax revenue objective  
 
Activities, not recorded by the tax and customs administrations, succeed in evading, in 
part, the tax burden which they should otherwise bear or collect; this results in a loss of tax 
revenue. This direct loss of tax revenue is compounded by an indirect loss stemming from the 
unfair competition exerted by the unrecorded sector on the official sector. Indeed, in the 
unrecorded sector, firms who evade regulations and tax burden, face lower production and 
transaction costs than the official firms. 
 
This phenomenon is likely to cause the decline
10 of honest firms which not only 
contribute directly to the tax revenue, but also collect taxes on the wages of their employees 
as well as indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties). In other words, there is an important risk of 
bankruptcy of the firms, which in sub-Saharan Africa, as in many other regions, collect the 
                                                 
9  Source: Guinean national authorities. 
10 Loayza (1996) shows that, for a sample of Latin American countries, the growth of the underground sector has 
a negative effect on the recorded sector. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
   
  9 
major part of internal tax revenue on behalf of the tax administrations. For instance, in Niger, 
the unfair competition stemming from large tax evaders severely affects the durability of the 
tax collection system. 
 
Hence, with regard to the tax revenue objective, taxing the unrecorded sector aims at 
both collecting tax revenue and preserving the durability of the tax collection system. 
 
3.2. Incentive objective 
 
  Submitting both recorded and unrecorded activities to similar tax obligations would 
not only be favorable to the public revenue objective, but would also reduce the distortions in 
the incentives system defined by the national authorities via tax and trade policies (Auriol, 
Walters, 2002; Feige, 1990). 
   
Indeed, by modifying the relative prices and incomes structure, taxes and more 
specifically tariffs, determine an incentives system. Insofar as the unrecorded sector avoids, at 
least in part, taxation, each firm faces a particular incentives system whose characteristics 
depend on its capacity to evade taxes. In other words, unrecorded firms face a price system 
for outputs and inputs different from that of honest firms. Therefore, resources allocation is 
affected by price distortions stemming from tax evasion. For instance, tariff evasion on rice 
imports in countries such as Guinea and Madagascar significantly reduces the protection of 
local rice.  
 
3.3. Equity objective 
   
The impact of the under-taxation of the unrecorded sector on the progressiveness of 
the tax system is ambiguous. 
 
On the one hand, tax evasion may introduce a certain degree of progressiveness into 
the system of indirect taxes (tariffs, VAT, excise duties). Indeed, if we consider that the 
poorest categories of the population are mainly supplied by the unrecorded sector, these 
categories therefore avoid, in part, indirect taxes on the products: unrecorded activities allow 
the reduction of the tax burden on the products consumed by the poorest. On the other hand, it 
is generally recognized that tax evasion relative to direct taxation has a regressive distribution 
effect. According to various analyses, the impact of tax evasion increases with the level of the 
taxpayer’s income (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998). In sub-Saharan African countries, 
tax evasion allows the tax burden of high-income earners belonging to TEA to be reduced. 
  
In summary, one of the consequences of a large unrecorded sector is to make the tax 
system more opaque and its redistribution effects more uncertain. In order to make up for 
these drawbacks, taxation of the unrecorded sector should aim at filling the gap between the 
actual tax system and the legal tax system, thus bringing it into line with the incentives and 
equity objectives of the national authorities. In particular, one of the most fundamental 
objectives it to redistribute the tax burden over all the economic units according to their 
taxable capacity.  
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
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4. Tax potential of the unrecorded sector: an evaluation 
 
The respective characteristics of informal activities and of TEA determine 
differentiated tax potential.  
 
4.1. Tax potential of informal activities 
 
Contrary to widespread opinion, the tax potential of informal micro-activities is 
already partially exploited through both direct and indirect taxation (Oudin, 1991; Morrisson 
et al. 1994; Maldonado, 1995). According to several country studies conducted by OECD 
(Morrisson et al., 1994), informal firms often bear a non-negligible direct tax burden (54 % of 
informal firms in Swaziland, 85 % in Tunisia). In this respect, the easiest tax to collect is the 
business tax (“patente” in francophone countries). Market place fees are also generally well 
accepted  insofar as they finance some local public services.  
 
Moreover, the informal micro-firms bear the incidence of indirect taxes. Indeed, 
informal micro-firms consume a large amount of intermediate goods and services subject to 
indirect taxes (VAT, excises taxes). For instance, in Senegal, intermediate consumption of 
most informal firms ranges from 40 % to 59 % of turnover (table 1). Insofar as their suppliers 
do not evade indirect taxes (tariffs, VAT and excise duties), the informal activities bear the 
incidence of taxes levied on their intermediate consumption
11. 
 
Table 1: Intermediate consumption of informal firms in Senegal  
Unit: % 







Production  100  100  100  100  100 
Intermediate 
consumption 
39.7  58.9  56.1  48.8  54 
Value added  60.3  41.1  43.9  51.2  46 
Source: Fall B (1997) 
 
 
   Despite their large contribution to production, most informal micro-firms have a low 
direct tax revenue potential (profit tax, business tax). Most informal micro-firms generate 
small profits which are divided into a large number of people participating in the activity of 
each informal firm. Moreover, the poor economic performance of numerous informal micro-
firms, their large number, their geographical dispersion and their inability to keep accounts or 
submit tax returns imply prohibitive administrative collection costs for direct taxes. Therefore, 
direct taxes from informal activities would be very difficult to collect at a reasonable cost 
even by means of a simplified direct tax system (cf. infra the case of the “Contribution du 
Secteur Informel” in Burkina Faso).  
                                                 
11 In the case of Peru, De Soto (1994) measured the considerable contribution in indirect taxes for the Peruvian 
informal sector. Through purchases of supplies from the modern sector, this author estimated this contribution to 
be 5.7 % of the GDP in 1985.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
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With regard to indirect taxes, and more specifically VAT, the amount of tax which 
would correspond to the value-added of each micro-firms is not collected. In this case also, it 
would not be efficient to try to collect these uncollected taxes because of the high 
administrative cost of collection: according to the tax code, the informal micro-activities are 
below the taxation threshold and moreover, these firms can in no way constitute reliable 
collectors of indirect taxes (VAT, etc.). On the one hand, the informal micro-firms are often 
managed by illiterate people unable to file tax returns and unreliable in satisfying their tax 
liabilities. On the other hand, the tax administration does not have the capacities to manage a 
very high number of taxpayers
12. 
 
4.2. Tax potential of the tax evasion activities 
 
 
  Tax evasion activities, whatever their scale, often compete with the activities of 
official firms. The tax evasion of TEA results in substantial losses in tax revenue and 
threatens the durability of the tax collection system. Thus, in various sub-Saharan African 
countries, the official trade networks for products such as second-hand cars, spare parts for 
cars, textiles, cigarettes or alcohol suffer unfair competition from TEA and, in some countries 
such as Niger (Barlow, Snyder, 1993), the official firms tend to become marginal.  
 
In African countries, as in other regions, the tax potential is highly concentrated at the 
level of the largest firms. Hence, tax enforcement of large-scale unrecorded firms should
13 
allow collection of indirect tax revenues, especially at the border. Moreover, as for indirect 
taxes, the large TEA exhibit a significant direct tax potential (profit tax, business tax, etc.) and 
they have to comply with their tax obligations. 
 
However, reducing tax evasion would likely result in a significant decrease of some 
commercial transactions. For instance, in Benin some trade flows, such as the re-exportation 
of cars, would disappear to the benefit of direct imports by Nigeria. In this case, Benin would 
suffer a dramatic decrease in its tax revenues. In other case, the official sector would take over 
market shares. For instance, this would probably occur for the textile trade in the Gulf of 
Guinea controlled by the informal businesswomen, called “Mama Benz”. Even if we allow a 
certain price elasticity of demand, which could involve a decrease in global consumption, a 
positive effect on tax revenue would be expected.  
 
5. Taxation strategies for unrecorded activities  
 
Before defining any taxation strategy, we must underline once again the socio-political 
dimension of tax compliance. In most countries, TEA are closely linked to the political 
authorities. Indeed, most attempts to enforce tax legislation have failed because of the 
political influence and impunity of special interest groups. We first examine a tax compliance 
                                                 
12 The risk would be the poor monitoring by the tax administration of the largest taxpayers who constitute the 
major part of the VAT potential. As in other countries (developed and developing countries) whatever the 
region, we may observe a very high concentration of the tax potential to the benefit of the largest firms. 
13 Unrecorded firms, which achieve a turnover above the legal taxation threshold, are legally obliged to collect 
the indirect taxes (VAT, excise duties, tariffs). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
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strategy for the TEA, characterized by a large unexploited tax potential. We then turn to the 
informal sector. 
 
5.1. Taxing “tax evasion activities”  
 
In order to tax the TEA, two types of measures could be undertaken: reducing tax non-
compliance and implementing a withholding profit tax. 
 
Tax enforcement vis-à-vis “tax evasion activities” 
 
The enforcement of tax laws vis-à-vis the large-scale TEA should be a crucial 
objective. The importance of the unexploited tax potential should lead to the enforcement of 
the current tax legislation, particularly at the border
14, and the implementation of standard 
administrative techniques (cross-checking of the firm’s data with their foreign trade 
transactions, checking through registered taxpayers
15, through public contracts, etc.). 
Implementing standard techniques to reduce tax evasion by large-scale firms seems feasible, 
even for weak tax and custom administrations
16. However, these standard techniques are 
rarely implemented in Africa due to the effective opposition of pressure groups mentioned 
above. 
 
Due to their large number, tax compliance of the small scale TEA is a difficult target. 
However, to some extent, tax evasion by the TEA could also be reduced by using standard 
procedures
17. For instance, when tax evasion takes place under cover of  “occasional 
imports”
18 , imposing the systematic identification of all professional importers by means of a 
Tax Identification Number (TIN) common to the customs and tax administrations would be a 
means of taxing their importations and, therefore, of reducing tax fraud. The main difficulty 
raised by this strategy, in most African countries, is the generally unsatisfactory 
implementation of the TIN. At the present time, it is still possible for smugglers to 
“occasionally” import in numerous countries and data crosschecking between the customs and 
tax administrations is still non-operational. 
 
Confronted with difficulties in enforcing tax legislation, in particular with regard to 
direct taxation, a withholding tax strategy has been implemented in numerous sub-Saharan 
countries. This strategy, which should represent a step towards a more comprehensive 
taxation of the TEA, would also allow an additional taxation of  the informal activities. 
 
                                                 
14 Internal taxes (direct and indirect) are more difficult to collect than customs taxes. 
15 For example, cf. Silvani (1992) 
16 On the other hand, visits from tax administration agents in the field do not seem appropriate in light of the lack 
administrative resources and the risks of corruption.  
17 It is nevertheless necessary to underline that the lack of human and material resources of the tax and customs 
administrations constitutes an obstacle as soon as a large number of taxpayers is to be monitored. 
18 In numerous African countries, “occasional imports” allow the anonymity of the importers vis-à-vis the 
customs and tax administrations. Moreover, these imports often benefit from a low level of taxation.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
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Withholding  profit tax 
  As a result of the poor management capacities of African administrations, the 
withholding tax strategy has been restricted to direct taxes (profit tax)
19. In this strategy, 
advance payment of profit tax allows taxation a minima of all unrecorded activities (TEA and 
informal activities). 
 
The advance profit tax payment is withheld either on imports, or on domestic sales at a 
rate generally ranging from 1 to 3 %. The tax is withheld either by the customs administration 
or by the registered firms. The registered importers and local producers subject to the profit 
tax can deduct the advance payment from the profit tax due. If the advance payment exceeds 
the actual profit tax due, the taxpayer may be refunded. For the unrecorded firms, the advance 
payment becomes a definitive tax
20. The main advantage of this mechanism, when correctly 
applied, is the collection of substantial tax revenues from the unrecorded sector.  
 
In Benin, (table 2), the withholding profit tax generated in 2001 a tax revenue of about 
20.7 billion CFA francs, i.e. almost 32 % of direct tax revenues
21. However, this strategy is 
not effective for identifying taxpayers. The amount of non-deducted advance payment 
highlights that the most of taxpayers prefer to remain anonymous. Anonymity facilitates 
evasion of other legal obligations and administrative red-tape. It should be noticed that, in 
order to tax some activities, a specific withholding tax can be implemented. Thus, in Benin, 
an advance payment of  50,000 CFA francs is withheld on each imported car and deductible 
from profit tax; this withholding tax allows a minimum profit tax to be collected from 
unregistered firms marketing second-hand cars. In 2001, the net revenue of this tax was 11.5 
billion CFA francs (cf. table 2), i.e. 22 % of direct tax revenue. 
                                                 
19 In certain countries, an advance tax payment was deductible for various taxes, notably indirect taxes (VAT, 
etc.). The disastrous experience of the ASDI (“accompte sur divers impôts”) in Côte d’Ivoire shows that this 
mechanism was unmanageable due to its complexity. 
20 To avoid an excess tax burden, the firms can register with the tax administration and request to be subject to 
the real tax profit regime. This is an anticipated effect of the withholding  tax system. 
21 Similarly, for beer distribution firms in Burkina Faso, an advance profit tax  (“Contribution sur les boissons”) 
is levied at brewery level, allowing 1.04 billion CFA francs to be collected whereas drink distribution firms are 
traditionally hard to tax.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
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Table 2: Withholding profit tax collection 
Unit: billion CFA francs 
  2000  2001  30
 June 2002 
1 Withholding profit tax: gross revenue 
 
8.3  9.2  4.8 
2 Deducted advance payment  
 
2.9  2.7  4.0 









4 Withholding profit tax: net revenue (1-2) 
 
5.4  6.5  0.8 
5 Special withholding profit tax for vehicles  7.4  12.4  5.7 
6 Deducted special withholding profit tax for 
vehicles  
0  0.9  1.4 
7 Proportion of deducted withholding profit 







8 Special advance payment on profit tax for 
vehicles: net revenue (5-6) 
7.4  11.5  4.3 
9 Net withholding tax  on services purchases 
 
2.8  2.7  Na 
10 Net global revenue of the withholding taxes 
(4+8+9) 
  
15.6  20.7  Na 











This system of withholding profit tax raises significant tax revenue in a very difficult 
environment, but it makes the tax system more complex. An efficient and fair implementation 
of this system rests on an effective reimbursement of the excess tax paid. It also requires that 
the advance payment should not be excessive compared to the profits generated by unrecorded 
activities (risk of over-taxation). The advance payment should, however, be sufficiently high 
to avoid an under-taxation. Moreover, the advance payments collected at the border increase 
the rate of customs taxation and therefore reinforce the incentive for tax evasion. Finally, the 
management and collection of this tax profit advance payment generates an additional 
compliance cost for registered firms.  
 
 
5.2. Taxation of informal activities: a unified business tax   
Foundations of a unified business  tax 
  Informal activities bear indirect taxes on their intermediate consumption as a definitive 
tax burden. Furthermore, most African countries have implemented a withholding profit tax 
(cf. above) which generates an additional definitive tax burden for informal activities. In light 
of the characteristics of these activities, their unexploited tax potential is weak.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
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However, subjecting informal activities to a direct tax appears important for two main 
reasons. First, taxpayers are far more aware of direct taxes than of indirect taxes. As a result, 
direct taxes can give the taxpayer the feeling of belonging to a community and therefore 
might encourage him to demand more efficient public expenditures. Second, a direct tax on 
informal activities can constitute a significant resource for local public finance. 
 
Experiences of simplified taxation of informal activities 
 
In the past, small firms in francophone Africa were subject to a complex tax system 
(the “forfait” system). The amount of different presumptive taxes
22 included in the “forfait” 
system (profit tax, VAT or turnover tax and business tax) were mainly calculated in relation 
to an estimated turnover, whereas small firms carried out no book-keeping. As a result of its 
complexity, this mechanism was rarely implemented and when it was, it favored corruption. 
Only the old business tax, traditionally considered as being an authorization to exercise a 
professional activity, was relatively well collected.  
 
Currently, a unified business tax is encountered in various African countries. For 
instance, since 1994 Benin has implemented a “Taxe Professionnelle Unique” (TPU). This 
option for a unified business tax substituted to all other taxes previously levied on small firms 
is a factor of simplification and efficiency. However, due to the lack of reliable book keeping, 
the reference to turnover in order to determine the tax base of this unified business tax still 
remains a source of uncertainty and complications. This often leads to untimely discussions 
between the taxpayers and the agents of the tax administration, or even to discretionary 
decisions. This is all the more detrimental as the tax revenue potential of this type of tax is 
low.  
 
The revenue from unified business taxes is generally low while its collection costs are 
high. Thus, in 2001 in Benin, the TPU on small activities generated a revenue of 2.4 billions 
CFA francs which can, for instance, be compared to the 11.5 billion CFA francs collected 
through the advance payments on vehicles (cf. table 2). Similarly, Burkina Faso implemented 
a “Contribution sur le Secteur Informel” which, in 2000, necessitated huge administrative 
resources for a total revenue of 820 millions CFA francs levied on 70,126 taxpayers, 
representing an average of approximately 15 US dollars per taxpayer
23.     
 
Implementing a unified business tax on informal activities 
 
The taxation system for small informal activities could therefore be greatly improved 
by adopting a simplified unified business tax. The scale of this tax would be determined 
according to objective indicators
24 of taxable capacity, with no reference to turnover. Hence, 
book-keeping and return filing would be eliminated. The tax base would be calculated from a 
tax scale determined according to objective and simple indicators which are easily 
                                                 
22 On the different presumptive tax systems, cf. Bulotoglu (1995), Thuronyi (2003). 
23 All statistical data were supplied by the tax administrations. 
24 These can be the nature of the activity, its geographical situation, the equipment used, etc. For restaurants, it 
could be the number of tables, seats, employees, etc. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
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recognizable
25. Such a tax, “impôt libératoire”, will shortly be implemented in Cameroon. The 
scale of the unified tax should naturally take into account any advance payment on profit tax, 
as well as the VAT incidence on intermediate consumptions (cf. supra).  
 
The extreme simplicity of this unified business tax would facilitate its understanding 
and acceptance by the taxpayers. It would also allow a reduction in monitoring costs by 
avoiding an excessive number of complex taxes with regard to these small taxpayers. For an 
efficient collection of the unified tax, it would be necessary to favor a spontaneous payment 
procedure based on periodic payments (most often a quarterly periodicity would be adequate). 
Collection visits in the field would aim at registering the informal taxpayers, checking the 
effective tax payments and collecting the tax from defaulters. The simplification introduced 
by a calculation of the unified business tax based on specific indicators would also allow the 
collection of this tax to be entrusted to the decentralized authorities
26: the unified business tax 




Unrecorded activities significantly contribute to the creation of wealth in countries 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Among these unrecorded activities, the tax evasion activities 
(TEA) should be distinguished. These activities exhibit a substantial unexploited tax potential 
which, if collected, could make easier the reduction of public deficits and/or provide 
additional public goods. Informal micro-activities, the second component of the unrecorded 
sector and for which tax fraud is not a decisive factor of expansion, already contribute to 
public revenues by bearing the incidence of indirect taxes (VAT, excise duties, tariffs) as well 
as paying advance payments on tax profits. Informal micro-activities thus represent a reduced 
unexploited tax potential. 
 
A more efficient taxation of the unrecorded sector, and especially of the TEA, would 
be favored by a harmonization of tax and customs legislations in bordering countries. Such an 
harmonization is currently in progress in some regional integration zones such as the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). However, despite significant  
improvement, severe distortions remain, notably vis-à-vis countries outside the zone 
(especially Nigeria). Distortions still exist even within the WAEMU due to the unequal 
implementation of tax and customs measures. 
 
The strategies for taxing unrecorded activities, and more particularly TEA, are 
confronted with considerable obstacles. Improvements are nevertheless possible, more 
precisely through a more strict implementation of import tax. With regard to direct taxation, 
the challenge which is proving difficult to overcome is to succeed in subjecting the largest tax 
evasion activities to an real tax regime and to monitor these taxpayers efficiently. Confronted 
with the difficulties caused by interest groups, a well enforced withholding profit tax 
constitutes the beginning of a solution.   
 
Informal activities are to be subject to a unified business tax, based on objective 
indicators, whose characteristics mark it out as a local tax. This tax should be sufficiently 
                                                 
25 This allows the taxpayer to know the criteria used to determine the amount of tax to be paid. 
26 In general, African tax administrations do not possess sufficient human and material resources to manage a 
large number of taxpayers.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.16 
   
  17 
simple to be understood by the taxpayers and to be collected, if necessary, by the local 
authorities.  The tax administrations of African countries do not have the human and material 
resources to manage large number of taxpayers, which means that local tax collection will 
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